'Mole and careless Pak army ensured early victory in 1971'

In a startling disclosure, a former deputy chief of India's external intelligence agency claims that the Research and Analysis Wing had a mole in Pakistan President General Yahya Khan's office, which prevented Pakistan making effective strikes inside India to put the offensive in the then East Pakistan on the back foot. Along with the mole, "the poor sense of communications security in the Pakistani Armed Forces" ensured that the war did not become a long-drawn battle, writes B Raman in the new book "The Kaoboys of RAW". Sumon K Chakrabarti, senior special correspondent with CNN-IBN, has more on it for bdnews24.com
Sumon K Chakrabarti

New Delhi, August 6 (bdnews24.com) -- In a startling disclosure, a former deputy chief of India's external intelligence agency claims that the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) had a mole in Pakistan President General Yahya Khan's office, which prevented Pakistan from making effective strikes inside India to put the offensive in the then East Pakistan on the back foot.

Along with the mole, "the poor sense of communications security in the Pakistani Armed Forces" ensured that the war did not become a long-drawn battle, writes B Raman in the new book "The Kaoboys of RAW".

Telephones were used "carelessly by senior officers, including Gen Yahya Khan, for conveying instructions to their officers in East Pakistan—without even taking basic precautions such as the use of scrambling devices to make their conversations unintelligible to anyone intercepting them," writes Raman in his book published last week.

Raman, one of India's best known spies, says that such a careless Pak Army ensures that "almost every day, Indira Gandhi and others entrusted with the conduct of the war had at their disposal extracts from the telephonic conversations of Yahya Khan and others with their officers in East Pakistan".

Raman also says the Pakistan Air Force also wanted to make a pre-emptive strike in India's western sector. But ''a mole in the office of General Yahya Khan reported that in the last week of November 1971" and the India Air Force was put on alert.

''Nothing happened on December 1 and 2 and the India Air Force HQ wanted to discontinue the alert but were persuaded to continue for another 24 hours before downgrading it on the morning of December 4.

"On the evening of December 3 (the first day of the war) the PAF launched its pre-emptive strike which was total failure,'' Raman says.

The book spans some very tumultuous times of modern India.

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